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SUMMARY 
In this paper we have studied some implications of fiaumol's (1959) 
manageriai model of the firm. Central in this model is a bankruptcy 
constraint in which production, wage costs and interest costs are 
important. It can be derived from this model that the usual decomposi-
tion of national income in a labor income share and a capital income 
share might better be replaced by a labor income share, a interest 
share and a profit share. Second, this theory predicts a positive 
relation between the real interest rate and unemployment, whereas the 
Standard neoclassical theory of the firm predicts a negative relation-
ship. Moreover, the concept of profit also differs from the neoclassi-
cal theory. There profits are usually defined as revenue minus wage 
costs, i.e., capital income, whereas here profit is defined as revenue 
minus wage and interest costs. When applied to actual U.S. data, these 
implications could not be rejected. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In the thirty or so years since the development of managerial theories 
of the firm by Baumol (1959), Marris (1964) and Williamson (1964),. only 
recently a number of issues stressed by these authors have gained 
renewed theoretical interest. The existence of a bankruptcy constraint 
to which these firms are subjected and the capital structure of firms 
concerning equity and debt are mentioned by Farmer (1985), Bernanke and 
Getier (1989) and Stiglitz (1992) among others. The self-interested 
manager, who is considered not only to act on behalf of the stock-
holders, but also in his own interest, is a central issue in 
Hart (1991). Since many of the present-day firms are of the managerial 
type, where ownership is diffuse and spread among a large number of 
anonymous shareholders and professional managers are in control, 
theories in which these phenomena are incorporated are likely to give a 
better explanation for observed firm behavior, than theories that do 
not incorporate these phenomena. Cf. Hart (1991). 
Most of these theories are developed to pro vide an explanation of 
the financial structure of the firm, more specifically the equity-debt 
ratio, its property rights or investment decisions. Cf. Bernanke and 
Getier (1989), Hart and Moore (1990), Hart (1991), Stiglitz (1992) and 
see also Jensen and Meckling (1976) for an early reference on this 
matter. However, few studies have focused on the employment decisions 
of such firms. Farmer (1985) has developed a model in an implicit 
contract approach with asymmetrie information, limited collateral and a 
bankruptcy constraint. This model implies a positive relation between 
the real interest rate and layoffs. 
Central issue in this paper is the question whether we can find 
empirical support for the implications of these managerial theories of 
the firm concerning (un)employment. It is not our intention to enter 
into the specifics of the many new theoretical developments in this 
area, but we simply look at the empirical implications for employment. 
We start form the 'old' managerial theory of Baumol (1959). Instead of 
maximization of profit, a firm in the sense of Baumol maximizes total 
revenues, subject to a bankruptcy constraint: the firm should make a 
minimum amount of profit to safeguard its viability and continuity. 
Violation of this constraint implies reorganizations and layoffs. 
The bankruptcy constraint may not only become binding due to wage costs 
that are too high, but also due to high interest costs on debts, caused 
by a high interest rate. This result has a number of implications. 
First, the usual neoclassical decomposition of national income in 
a labor income share and a capital income share, might better be 
replaced by a decomposition in a labor income share, an interest income 
share and a profit share. Instead of the usual positive relation 
between the capital income share and employment, we should find a more 
pronounced relation between the profit share and employment. 
Second, this theory implies that the interest rate has a positive 
relation with unemployment, whereas the neoclassical theory predicts a 
negative relationship. The first stresses the f act that the interest 
rate influences the interest costs, which in its turn affects the risk 
of bankruptcy and hence reorganizations and layoffs. The latter 
stresses the possibility of substitution between labor and capital: if 
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interest rates increase it is profitable to substitute the relatively 
expensive capital for relatively cheap labor, which in its turn 
decreases unemployment. 
Third, we try to test this very simple theory directly by 
modeling a relation between profits and employment, where profits are 
not defined in the usual way as revenue minus wage costs, but as 
revenue minus wage and interest costs. It appears that in all these 
three cases the implications of this theory with bankruptcy constraint 
cannot be denied. The possibility of bankruptcy appears to be impor-
tant. See, Stiglitz (1992). This provides evidence against the Standard 
neoclassical theory of the firm. See also Bierens and Broersma (1991). 
2. MANAGERIAL THEORY WITH BANKRUPTCY CONSTRAINT 
In this section we discuss the managerial theory of Baumol (1959), 
augmented with a flexible labor effort rate. This theory stresses the 
separation of ownership and control of modern, large and medium-sized 
firms. These firms are led by managers instead of the owners and the 
objectives of managers differ form the ones of the owners. 
Baumol (1959) postulates that these firms maximize sales revenues 
instead of profits. Profits only play a role as a constraint: a certain 
minimum profit is required in order to safeguard the viability and 
continuity of the firm. This is the bankruptcy constraint. Let R(X) = PX 
be the revenue function, with X the output, and let C(X) = WL+RPi;K be the 
cost function, which consists of wage costs, WL, and interest costs, 
RPkK, with Pk the price level of capital goods and K is the capital 
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stock, which is assumed fixed in the short run. The other variables are 
defined as in the previous section. We assume a Leontief production 
function, hence X = mm{odL,8K}, where o: and 8 are positive parameters 
and / is the labor effort rate, which is bounded to a maximum 7, 0</<7. 
Finally, 7r and ït denote actual and minimum required profit, respective-
ly. The model of Baumol can be written as 
max. R{X)=PX 
s.t. n(X) = R(X) - C(X) > ff (1) 
We start from the situation where the bankruptcy constraint (1) 
is not binding. Let L0 be the initial labor force and X be the revenue 
maximizing output level. We only consider the employment L of the firm. 
In this initial stage we have 
L = L0 if R(X*) - WL0 - RPkK > if. (2) 
Consider next an interest rate increase from R to R'. Thus, the firm 
f aces higher fixed costs. Assume that constraint (2) is no longer 
satisfied. Then some workers might be laid off and the remaining labor 
force should increase its effort, so that the optimal output level X 
can be restored. If the labor effort rate is increased to its maximum 
level 7, then employment of the firm drops from L0 to A /(ocl), so 
(R{X*) - WL0 - R'PkK < 7f 
L = Z*/(cv / ) if \ _ (3) 
[R(X*) - WX*j {ocl) - R' PkE > n. 
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Consider next that the interest rate increase is so large that 
the optimal output level can no longer be reached, even when workers 
are laid off and 7 = 7. In that case more workers are laid off until an 
output level X' is reached for which the bankruptcy constraint is. just 
satisfied. Hence 
(R(X*) - WX*/(ccl) - R'PkR < Sf 
L = X'Hccl) if \ (4) 
[R(X') - WX'f(al) - R'PkK = ft. 
Finally, we can also imagine the situation where there is no 
output level for which the bankruptcy constraint (2) is satisfied. In 
that case the firm is no longer viable and it has to shut down. 
Employment will then drop to zero 
L = 0 if R{X) - WX/(ocl) - R'PkK < 7f, for all X. (5) 
Notice that an increase in the wage rate or a decrease in 
production will have a similar effect as the interest rate increase 
described above. If W increases to W' the bankruptcy constraint may 
become binding with the same consequences for employment as (3), (4) 
and (5). 
In this theory the level of employment in a firm is related to 
the wage costs, via the wage rate, to the interest costs, via the 
interest rate and to the output. Or in other words, employment depends 
on the actual profit made in relation to a certain specified minimum 
amount of profit. Notice that in this case profit is not equal to the 
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return on capital, its definition in the neoclassical theory. Here 
profits are defined as the revemie minus wage and interest costs. 
Essential feature in this model, which is also present in the 
theories of Marris (1964) and Williamson (1964), is the presence of a 
bankruptcy constraint. It not necessary to only consider alternative 
theories of firm behavior. This bankruptcy constraint might also be 
included in the Standard neoclassical theory of the firm to give 
similar results. The probability and costs of bankruptcy are an 
important phenomenon in the discussion about the micro foundations of 
macroeconomics. Cf. Stiglitz (1992). 
3. IMPLICATIONS 
3.1 Decomposition of value added 
In this section, we look at data that might confirm the implications of 
the theory of Baumol presented above. Since interest costs are impor-
tant and only managerial firms are considered, we exclude banks and 
financial institutions, as well as the government sector from our 
analysis and restrict attention to nonfinancial corporations. We focus 
attention to the relation between employment and the capital income 
share and employment and the profit share.The first is connected to the 
usual neoclassical theory of the firm and the latter to our managerial 
theory with bankruptcy constraint. 
In figure 1, we show the percentage change of employment of 
nonfinancial enterprises (PEMPnf) and the usual decomposition of the 
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value added of nonfinancial enterprises in a labor income share (LISnf) 
and capital income share (CISnf). The latter corresponds to the 
neoclassical concept of profit. According to this theory there is a 
negative relation between LISnf and PEMPnf and hence a positive 
relation between CISnf and PEMPnf. It is obvious from figure 1 that 
there is some resemblance between CISnf and PEMPnf, but the evidence is 
not overwhelming. 
- insert figure 1 somewhere around here -
In figure 2, we present the same PEMPnf, but now the value added 
of nonfinancial enterprises is decomposed into a labor income share 
(LISnf), a profit share (PSnf) and a rest share (RSnf). This rest share 
consists for the largest part of interest costs of firms. The profit 
share is 100% minus labor income and rest share. It is obvious from 
figure 2 that there is a clear similarity in the pattern of PEMPnf and 
PSnf and that this resemblance is much more pronounced than the one 
between CISnf and PEMPnf of figure 1. 
- insert figure 2 somewhere around here -
The bankruptcy constraint (1) can be interpreted in the same way 
as the decomposition of the value added in figure 2. When (1) is divide 
by PX we have 
n/PX = 1 - WL/PX - RPkK/PX > ïï/PX. (6) 
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In (6) n/PX is PSnf, WL/PX is LISnf and RPkR/PX is RSnf. Since in this 
theory, employment depends not only on the wage costs, but also on the 
interest costs, we can state that labor demand and hence also unemploy-
ment is a function of sales revemie, wage costs and interest costs. 
These simple figures with decompositions and employment cannot 
reject the implications of the bankmptcy constraint in our theory. In 
fact, the evidence of a positive relation between profits and employ-
ment is stronger from figure 2 than from figure 1. This favors our 
theory of section 2. 
3.2 Multivariate analysis 
In this subsection we will test the implications of the theory of 
section 2 in yet another way. This theory implies that unemployment 
depends on the wage rate, the interest rate and production. Our simple 
static theory does not specify a dynamic relationship. Hence on a macro 
level, it is not capable of representing adjustment costs, habit 
persistence, decision lags and aggregation over firms with different 
dynamic responses. Hence, the lag structure has to be determined 
empirically. To capture as much of the interdependencies of the time 
series involved, we will construct a VAR and a VARMA model and we will 
concentrate on the variables that are Granger causing unemployment. 
As a first step in building these models, we examine whether the 
macroeconomic time series variables that we use contain a unit root. We 
apply the unit root test of Dickey and Fuller (1979, 1981). We use 
quarterly, seasonally adjusted data from 1970.1 to 1991.4, which are 
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obtained from the OECD, Main Economie Indicators. All variables, except 
unemployment are deflated with the producers price index of finished 
goods in order to get the real variables. See appendix 1. The Dickey-
Fuller procedure is to estimate the model 
AXt = a + bt + cX^ + Epj=1djAXt_j + et. (7) 
The null hypothesis of a unit root is equivalent to H0: c = 0. The 
critical values of the ï-statistic of c, i(c), are in Fuller (1976, pp. 
373). For a model which includes a trend, the 5% and 10% critical 
values are -3.45 and -3.15 respectively, when the number of observa-
tions is about 100. The results of this test procedure are presented in 
table I. In our case, a value of p = l is sufficiënt for an adequate 
representation, except for the real interest rate where p = 0 yields 
adequacy. 
The power and size properties of unit root tests has recently 
been questioned by several authors. Cf. Blough (1989), Cochrane (1991). 
From the results of table I, we find that a unit root in the log of 
real output and the log of real wages cannot be rejected. However, the 
presence of a unit root in unemployment and the real interest rate is 
ambiguous. The test statistic for unemployment is significant at 10% 
but not at 5%. The statistic for the real interest rate is just 
insignificant at 10%. Both unemployment and the real interest rate are 
bounded variables and we cannot imagine a time trend converging to 
infinity to be present in these series. Moreover, both series are 
assumed to have zero steady state growth rates or constant steady state 
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levels. A genuine unit root can therefore not be present in these 
series for reasons of logical consistency. The test results point 
toward the presence of a near-unit root. Hence, we assume a unit root 
in the log of real output and real wages, but no unit root in unemploy-
ment and real interest rate. 
Table I. Unit root test results of the Dicky-Fuller test, t(c). 
t(c) 
unemployment rate (u) -3.38 
real interest rate (r) -3.05 
log of real output (lny) -1.54 
log of real wages (lm/;) -1.27 
Our models contain dummies to represent structural breaks. First, 
due to the unanticipated price increase in 1974.1, caused by the oil 
crisis of late 1973, the growth rates of real output and real wages 
exhibit a large trough in 1974.1. Hence a dummy DIAql was included in 
Ajlny and z^lmu, which is 1 for 1974.1 and zero elsewhere. 
The recession that foliowed these events about a year later 
caused an upward shift in the natural rate of unemployment in 1975. Cf. 
OECD, Economie Surveys 1983 and 1985. Therefore a dummy Dlbql being 1 
in 1975.1 and zero elsewhere was included. In addition there was also a 
change in the path of real industrial production from 1975 onwards. 
Hence, Dlhql was also included in the model for A^ny. 
Finally, we mention that at the beginning of the 1980's there was 
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a regime shift to a tight monetary rule in the USA. However, in 1980 
this rule had the character of a stop-go policy. In 1980.1 the discount 
rate was increased from 12% to 13%. In 1980.2 it was decreased 2 
percentage points to 11% and in 1980.4 it was raised again to 13%. Cf. 
OECD, Economie Surveys, 1982. We included a dummy D80q24 in the model, 
with 1980.2 equal to 1 and 1980q4 equal to - 1 and zero elsewhere. 
As a first data summary we start with the usual VAR model of the 
four variables involved and conduct tests of causality in the sense of 
Granger (1969). The VAR setting in which these tests are performed is 
characterized as a VAR model with five lags. The aforementioned dummy 
variables were also included. Hence, 
$(L)zt = pL + et, (8) 
where $(L) = I-E?=1$jL:i, L3zt = zt_j, \i is the constant including the 
various dummies, et is a zero mean, serially uncorrelated error process 
and zt = (u,r,A1]ny,A1\nw)'. It is imperative that the specification of 
(8) is correct in order to draw valid conclusions from it. Model 
correctness is implied by the property that the conditional expectation 
of the error process relative to the entire past of the time series 
process equals zero with probability one. Hence 
E[*tl*t-u*t-2>----] = 0, a.s. (9) 
Notice that the usual assumption of normally distributed errors is not 
implied by this property. However, the usual assumption of absence of 
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autocorrelated disturbances is implied by (9). Hence, this is an 
important property, which we test for using the Lagrange Multiplier 
test on autocorrelated disturbances of the separate equations of (8). 
If these tests do not accept the absence of autocorrelation, then (9) 
will also not be satisfied. Property (9) implies that we have first 
order model correctness in the sense of Domowitz and White (1982) and 
if (9) is satisfied we have a mean innovation process in the sense of 
Hendry and Richard (1982). We also apply the ARCH test of Engle (1982), 
the Jarque and Bera (1980) normality test, even though it is not 
essential for model correctness, and the Chow predictive failure test. 
As Granger causality test we use an F-test to asses the validity of 
excluding lagged variables from (8). 
We started this analysis with a VAR model with five lags and 
tested whether this number could be decreased. Using an F-test on 
parameter restrictions, we found that a VAR(3) is sufficiënt. With this 
model we conducted tests on Granger causality. See table II. 
As a second, more parsimonious data summary, we consider a VARMA 
instead of a VAR model. So instead of (7) we have 
#(L)z t = il + 0(L)et, (10) 
where #(£) = I-EPj=1$jL3, 0(L) = I + I^=10jL3 and et should again be a mean 
innovation process as in (9). In practical applications it is complica-
ted to identify this model and estimate its parameters. This is usually 
done by maximum likelihood estimation, see, e.g., Hannan (1970), 
Akaike (1973) and Hillmer and Tiao (1979). This implies that the 
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Table II. Granger causality tests based on a VAR(3) model. 
Test for Granger by test statistic 
causality of 
u V F(3,71) = 6.39f 
A^ny F(3,71) = 3.89f 
Ailnw F(3,71) = .973 
r A^ F(3,71) = 1.34 
Z\xlny F( 3,71) = .069 
A^w F(3,71) = .710 
AiU, Z^lny, A^nw F( 9,71) = .966 
Z^lny u F(3,71) = 4.14 f 
r F(3,71) = 5.64f 
A^lmv F( 3,71) = .513 
^d1lniy u F(3,71) = 5.45 t 
r F(3,71) = 2.55 
Z^lny F(3,71) = 3.60 t 
r Z^lny Axlnw 
2.65 t .716 .639 
1.51 .711 .703 
.015 .152 1.08 
.350 .036 4.15 
1.21 1.50 1.44 
significant at 5% 
distribution of the data is assumed to be known, usually a normal 
distribution. However, in practice this distribution is usually not 
known. Moreover, normality is not implied by (9), hence it is not a 
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Misspecification tests u 
Autocorr. f>u?(4,67) .678 
F^(8,63) 1.16 
ARCH *W;/(1,83) .325 
Normality xnorm{2) 7.83t 
Chow FCftou,(12,59) .736 
necessary prerequisite for model correctness. 
We suggest a more simple way of identifying and estimating these 
VARMA models. Our method is based on the fact that a VARMA model can be 
considered as a system of ARMAX models. See, e.g., den Butter and van 
de Gevel (1989), where a similar procedure is applied. If we define, 
zt = (xitT-,yt,--,xktY a n d # = («! , . . , 0, . . ,a f c) ' is a corresponding 
division, then an ARMAX model is 
<P(L)yt = n + oc(L)xt + 0(L)eit, (11) 
where yt is the dependent variable and xt is the vector of explanatory 
variables, (f>{L) = l-Epj=1^jLj, oc(L) = Epj=1ocjLj, 6(L) = l + Eqj=19jLj and eit is 
the i-th element of et in (10), which also satisfies (9). Hence 
£[£itl(yt-i,*t-i)',(yt-2,*U)V---] = ° a-s- (12) 
It is obvious that a VARMA can be written as a system of ARMAX models 
if 0(L) is diagonal. But also if not each equation in (10) can be 
written as an ARMAX model. To see this we use the fact that 
0(L)_ 1 = [dete(L)r x¥(L) , 
where lP(L) is the matrix of cofactors of 0(L). Premultiplykig both 
sides of (9) with 9(L) yields 
¥(L)$(L)zt = [det©(I)]e t. (13) 
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Thus every VARMA model can be written as a system of ARMAX models. 
Since we make no assumptions about the distribution of the data 
Z = (z1,z2,...zt,...,zT)', we do not use maximum likelihood estimation. 
Instead, we estimate the consecutive ARMAX models with nonlinear . least 
squares, with the presample data set equal to the mean value of the 
corresponding observable values. An ARMAX model like (11) can easily be 
written as an ARX(oo) model, i.e., yt = <7((/3)-|-et, where 
gt(p) = >(/3) + Sfj^VjiftZt-j, 
'T* 
and 2 t = zf if t>l and zt = z =l/TEj=1Zj if t<l. In this case the least 
squares estimator /3 of j3 is defined by 
Q{
^ =
 i n W / r r ^ = i [ y t " f f t ( / 3 ) ] 2 ' 
where B is the parameter space. Consistency and asymptotic normality 
of the least squares estimator is proved by Bierens (1991). 
We specify our ARMAX models as follows: in (11) we set p — l and 
q — 2 and hope that this specification is general enough to represent the 
data generating process giving rise to yt. This model specification is 
tested extensively using a number of misspecification tests. We apply 
tests on autocorrelated residuals, a normality test, an ARCH test, and 
a predictive failure test. If this initial specification is not 
rejected by any of these tests, it may be simplified by testing if we 
can delete variables with insignificant parameters from the model. The 
ultimate results of this specification analysis are in table IEL 
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Granger causality between variables can directly be observed from 
table UI. We only present the variables with parameters significantly 
different from zero and precisely these variables are Granger causing 
the dependent variable yt. It appears that the difference betweea OUT 
method and the usual VAR approach is very small. From table II, we find 
that unemployment is Granger caused by the real interest rate and real 
output growth. From table III, it appears that also the real wage 
growth is important for unemployment. Ho wever, if we substitute the 
ARMAX model of the real wage rate into the unemployment model, we 
eventually find a model with only interest rate and output as Granger 
causing variables. We can also derive from table II that all three 
variables appear important for the real wage rate, whereas from table 
III only unemployment and interest rate are. However, if the unemploy-
ment and interest rate equations of table III are substituted into the 
wage model, then the real wages are also Granger caused by all three 
variables. Thus, the two model specifications yield very similar 
results. 
In both the VAR and the VARMA model, we find a significant 
positive Granger causal relation between unemployment and the real 
interest rate. This relation is confirmed when we consider the impulse 
response functions based on the VAR(3) of table II and the VARMA model 
of table III. The impulse response function of a one percentage point 
real interest rate shock on unemployment is very similar for both 
specifications. The response function of the VAR model, which exhibits 
slow dampening, is presented in figure 3, whereas that of the VARMA 
model is given in figure 4. The peak of both functions is reached af ter 
- 17 -
Table III. Estimation and test results ARMAX models. 
Vt- Z\xlny AJnu; 
D74gl 
D75ql 
D80q2q4 
D74ql+D75ql 
«-1 
r
-i 
Alny_x 
0i 
.184 
.901 
.903 
.043 
[1.03] 
[10.7] 
[33.4] 
[3.13] 
1.21 [1.79] -1.19 [-1.27] -.512 [-.522] 
-5.04 [-11.9] 
-.084 [-5.94] 
.080 [3.99] 
.318 [2.49] 
-7.83 [-8.06] 
.880 [11.4] 
-.195 [-2.52] 
.562 [3.95] 
-6.35 [-15.4] 
.578 [4.54] 
-.291 [-4.79] 
.330 [4.94] 
.275 [1.95] 
.102 [-2.14] 
.305 [-2.38] 
.452 [3.28] 
0, 
S.E. .223 1.01 1.57 1.15 
R2 .973 .913 .619 .283 
T 87 87 87 87 
Xpar\k) 1.51 (* = 1) 7.33 (fc = 3) 4.13 (* = 3) .962 (k = 2) 
XnornA^I 3.82 8.45f .464 5.05 
FAR(4,K) 1.42 (n = 76) 1.14 (n = 78) .539 (n = 78) 1.52 (n = 77) 
* A * ( M ) .891 (n = 72) 1.43 (n = 74) 1.52 (n = 74) .755 (n = 73) 
FARCH(1,85) .173 3.85 .163 3.09 
X/(12)/12 .071 .435 1.27 1.56 
Note: S.E. is the Standard error of the regression, R is the correla-
tion coëfficiënt, T is the number of observations used (1970.3-1991.4). 
The i-values based on the heteroskedasticity-consistent covariances of 
White (1980) are denoted in squared brackets. XpaA^) *s a Wald test on 
parameter restrictions with a x distribution with k degrees of freedom 
under the null. Xnorm is t n e t e s t o n normally distributed errors of 
Kiefer and Salmon (1983), which is equivalent to the familiar Jarque 
and Bera (1980) test and follows a X (2) distribution under the null. 
F^g is an F-version of the LM residual autocorrelation test of Cumby 
and Huizinga (1990) and follows an F(m,n) distribution under the null. 
FARCH is t n e familiar ARCH test of Engle (1982) and has a F(s,t) 
distribution under the null. Finally, X/(0/ ' is t n e predictive failure 
test of Hendry (1979) divided by its number of degrees of freedom /. 
This is an index of predictive failure, where values exceeding 2 imply 
a poor forecasting performance. Values marked are significant at 5%. 
18 
about two years and its value is around 0.25 percent of the civilian 
labor force. This corresponds to a rise in unemployment of roughly 
300,000 persons. 
- insert figures 3 and 4 around here -
Thus, this multivariate analysis of macroeconomic time series 
cannot reject the implication of the theory of Baumol of section 2, 
namely that there is both a positive relation between the wage rate and 
unemployment and a positive relation between the interest rate and 
unemployment. The neoclassical theory however, predicts a positive 
relation between the wage rate and unemployment and a negative relation 
between the interest rate and unemployment. Hence, the latter theory 
cannot be confirmed. 
3.3 An empirical labor demand model 
As a final test of the implications of our theory of section 2, we 
consider the fact that this theory implies that employment of the firm 
is determined by the actual profit in relation with a certain minimum 
profit level. Hence, labor demand is a function of profit, defined as 
sales revenue minus wage and interest costs, or equivalently of the 
profit share, PSnf. However, this function is unlikely to yield an 
adequate specification, since it is static. We therefore determine the 
lag structure empirically, by starting with a general distributed lag 
model that better represents the dynamic properties of the data 
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<j)(L)\aEMPnf = n + a(L)PSnf + e, (14) 
where <p(L) = 1 - E^dpjL3 and cv(L) — E^oCXjL1'. This general model could be 
simplified to the model presented in table IV. A dummy is included to 
represent the fall in the natural rate of employment; see section 3.2. 
This model specification is subjected to quarterly data from 1970.1 to 
1991.4, collected from the Survey of Current Business; see appendix 1. 
The sum of autoregressive coefficients in <p(L) of (14) was very close 
to unity, which is why we took the first difference of the log of 
employment. It appears that this model does not reject the theory of 
Baumol on which it is based. Moreover, the model also satisfies a large 
number of other statistical properties being tested for. There is no 
residual autocorrelation, no heteroskedasticity or functional form 
misspecification, no ARCH and no evidence of omitted variables. Other 
important properties our model satisfies are parameter constancy and 
absence of predictive failure. Two large outliers in the early eighties 
imply high excess kurtosis, hence normality is not accepted. However, 
as argued in section 3.2, normality is not essential for model correct-
ness (9) or (12). Moreover, inclusion of two additional dummies yields 
a model virtually the same as that of table IV, which no longer suffers 
from nonnormality, hence our results seem quite robust. 
So also this simple empirical employment model, with the profit 
share as percentage of the value added of nonfinancial enterprises as 
explanatory variable provides corroborating evidence in favor of our 
theory of section 2. 
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Table IV. Estimation and test results of (14) 
AilaEMPnft = -1.45 - 2.93 D75ql + .254 A^nEMPnf^ + .201 PSnft + et 
[.511] (.639) [.084] [.057] 
S.E. = .635 R = .426 T = 86 (70.3-91.4) DW = 2.05 
XnarmY^) = 27.5 
F^(4,78) = .60 F^(8,74) = 1.26 
FARCH^W) = -072 
Fx?(5,76) = .550 
Normality: 
Autocorrelation: 
ARCH: 
Heteroskedasticity: 
Functional form: 
RESET: 
Forecast: 
Fx*x.(6Jb) = All 
FRESET(1^1) = -027 
X/(16)/16 = .340 
FCHOW(l6,66) = .320 
Note: Estimation and testing was performed using PC-GIVE. Estimation is 
by least squares and the Standard errors based on the heteroskedastici-
ty consistent covariance estimator of White (1980) are in square 
brackets, except for the dummy where the usual Standard error is 
presented. Fj4^ is the LM test on residual autocorrelation, FARCH *S 
Engle's ARCH test. The normality test is due to Jarque and Bera (1980). 
Fxfi tests on heteroskedasticity due to squares of regressors and 
FXi*xj is t n e heteroskedasticity test of White (1980). F^ESET *S *n e 
RESET test. X/(16)/(16) is the predictive failure test advocated by 
Hendry (1979), cf. table III, and FCHOW is the familiar Chow test on 
predictive failure. Finally, means significance at 5%. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have studied some of the implications of an alterna-
tive theory of the firm, based on Baumol (1959). We found that these 
implications could not be rejected by data for the USA. We .do not claim 
that our theory provides the only interpretation for our empirical 
models. However, considering the renewed interest of a number of 
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authors in alternative theories of the firm, where managerial discre-
tion, agency costs, capital structure and the risk of bankruptcy are 
important, we feel that our empirical results might provide corrobora-
ting evidence in favor of these theories. Not only wage costs, but. also 
interest costs, i.e., costs connected to the financial structure of the 
firm, are important for the employment decisions of those firms. 
This also implies that the usual policy of wage moderation might 
not be enough in reducing unemployment. From figure 2, it is obvious 
that the effect of wage moderation, which results in a lower labor 
income share (LISnf), can be disposed of by increasing interest costs 
of firms. If the increase in interest costs (RSnf) is large enough, it 
may offset the lower LISnf and causes profits PSnf to decrease. Lower 
profits lead to lower employment and hence higher unemployment. In this 
way an increase in the interest rate might lead to a fall in profits, 
via increasing interest costs, and hence to lower employment. An 
increase in the wages or wage costs might have a negative effect on 
employment for the same reason of lower profits. 
Hence, we not only emphasize the role of wages and wage costs on 
employment, but we also point out that the interest rate and interest 
costs might be important in determining employment. In the same way, 
this implies a different concept of profits. Usually profits are 
considered to be equal to revenue minus wage costs. We have argued that 
also the interest costs might be important, which implies that profits 
should be defined as revenue minus wage and interest costs. The 
positive relation between employment and this concept of profit can 
also not be rejected by data for the USA. 
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APPENDIX 1. DATA 
The data we used for the VAR and VARMA model were obtained from the 
Main Economie Indicators of the OECD. The sample period considered, was 
1970.1-1991.4 and we used seasonally adjusted data. 
u: unemployment rate as percentage of the civilian labor force, 
seasonally adjusted 
R: prime interest rate in percentage per annum 
Y: index of total industrial production, seasonally adjusted 
W: index of hourly earnings in manufacturing 
P : index of producers prices for finished goods 
The interest rate, output and wages were deflated with P as follows: 
r = R - [100*(P-P(-4)) /P(-4)] 
lny = (lnF - lnP)*100 
lnw = (InW - lnP)*100 
The data we used for figures 1 and 2 and estimation of equation (14) 
are taken from the US Department of Commerce, Survey of Current 
Business, Washington DC, various issues. They were taken from the 
following tables: 
Gross Domestic Product of Corporate Business in Current Dollars and 
Gross Domestic Product of Nonfinancial Corporate Business in Current 
and Constant Dollars: 
series: Corporate profits with inventory valuation and capital 
consumption adjustment (Pnf) 
GDP of nonfinancial corporate business (GDPnf) 
Compensation of employees (of nonfinancial corporate business) 
(Wnf) 
- 26 -
Current Business Statistics: Labor Force, Employment and Earnings: 
series: Total employees, private sector (excl. government sector) (E) 
Total employees financial, insurance and real estate sector 
(Ef) 
The variables we use are defined as 
EMPnf = E - Ef 
LISnf = lOO*{Wnf/GDPnf) 
PSnf = 100* (Pnf/GDPnf) 
RSnf = 100 - LISnf - PSnf 
CISnf = 100 - LISnf 
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Figure 1. Percentage change in employment of nonfinancial enterprises 
(PEMPnf) and decomposition of the value added of nonfinancial 
enterprises in labor and capital income shares (LISnf and CISnf) 
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Figure 2. Percentage change in employment of nonfinancial enterprises 
(PEMPnf) and decomposition of the value added of nonfinancial 
enterpr ises in a labor income share (LISnf), a res t share (RSnf) 
and a profit share (PSnf). 
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Figure 3. Impulse response of unemployment r a t e to a unit 
interest r a t e shock, based on a VAR(3) model. 
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Figure 4. Impulse response of unemployment r a t e to a unit 
interest r a t e shock, based on a VARMA model. 
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